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Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are a form of statutory pen-
sion program designed to invest employee retirement assets in the stock of
the employer.1 A leveraged ESOP borrows money to finance the stock
purchase. As a congressionally sanctioned "technique of corporate fi-
nance," 2 the leveraged ESOP program represents the leading legislative
effort to date to transfer controlling equity blocks in American corpora-
tions from outside shareholders to workers. While the cost of the pro-
gram's tax subsidies has not been reliably calculated, the foregone reve-
nues to the Treasury could well exceed several billion dollars annually.
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1. For a description of the ESOP program and governing statutes, see infra note 11. See also
infra notes 12-15, 23, 29 and accompanying text.
2. 129 CONG. REc. S16629, S16636 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983) (statement of Sen. Long) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Long Statement]. See also J. KAPLAN & R. LUDwIG, ESOPs A-16 (BNA Tax Mgmt.
Portfolio No. 354-2nd, 1983) ("[Leveraged ESOPs] can be used for financing corporate growth,
tender offers, acquisitions, going private, or increasing the corporation's working capital. Leveraged
ESOPs are thought to be especially useful in mergers or divestitures of subsidiaries and shareholder
buy-outs.").
3. According to the Office of Management and Budget, the total cost of ESOP subsidies will
amount to $2.5 billion in 1986, increasing to at least $4.4 billion by 1990. Hoerr, ESOPs: Revolution
or Ripoffi, Bus. Wx., Apr. 15, 1985, at 94, 94.
Two analytic problems make more precise estimation difficult. First, foregone tax dollars are prop-
erly measured relative to an alternative corporate structure, but such a comparison is difficult to
establish without the equivalent of a tax expenditure budget. See Bittker, Accounting for Federal
"Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAx J. 244, 248 (1969) (measurement of subsi-
dies requires construction of "ideal or correct income tax structure, departures from which will be
reflected as 'tax expenditures' in the National Budget"). For a definition of tax expenditure and a
discussion of associated difficulties of measurement, see Graetz & McDowell, Tax Reform 1985: The
Quest for a Fairer, More Efficient and Simpler Income Tax, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 5, 13 (1984)
("Tax expenditures are defined generally as provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that allow spe-
cial exclusions, deductions, deferrals or credits to encourage particular economic activities or to benefit
particular categories of taxpayers.").
Assume, for example, a public corporation paying $100 in tax chooses an employee buyout (result-
ing in no taxable income due to tax expenditures) over a conventional, non-employee buyout (paying
$50 in taxes). No good theory exists for determining whether the ESOP tax expenditure is incremen-
tal to the tax bill of the initial corporation or to the tax bill resulting from the rejected conventional
deal.
Second, cost estimates will depend on the number and size of deals closed in the future. Lawyers
and bankers generally report an extremely high interest in leveraged ESOPs, and the size of deals is
exploding. See, e.g., National Center For Employee Ownership, New Tax Law Causes Surge in
Interest in Employee Ownership, EMPLoYE OWNERSHip, Feb. 1985, at 5 (available from the Na-
tional Center For Employee Ownership, Arlington, Va.). The flexibility of the leveraged ESOP as a
Leveraged ESOPs
And unlike the vast array of consumption-oriented transfer programs
sponsored by the government, the leveraged ESOP program aims to shift
ownership of the nation's productive assets to workers."
The program's impact extends from the small, closely-held corporation
to the largest enterprises in the United States.5 At the political level, nu-
merous groups view leveraged ESOPs as a key tool for social reform and
national industrial policy.' Many state governments have adopted similar
financing vehicle may result in a program far more costly than anticipated.
4. The ESOP program's goal is to broaden capital ownership. See infra text accompanying notes
43-51. The "institutions and conventions of finance" are specifically intended to be the instrumentali-
ties that will distribute ownership of capital "that has yet to be created." Long Statement, supra note
2, at S16634.
5. Numerous factors motivate the use of leveraged ESOPs. Some managers of public companies
prefer a private, closely-held operating structure. See, e.g., The Tax Magic That's Making Employee
Stock Plans Multiply, Bus. WK., Oct. 15, 1984, at 158, 158 (William Leonhard, President of Parsons
Corporation, "long wanted to restructure his company along the lines of a law or accounting firm, in
which employees can be rewarded-and motivated-as if they were partners."). In closely-held firms,
aging owners may want liquidity or the current owners may decide that the workers are the group
best equipped to continue running the firm. See National Center for Employee Ownership, Compa-
nies, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHP, Feb. 1985, at 2 [hereinafter cited as Companies]. Public companies
have responded to hostile takeover bids by going private or placing a large block of stock in an em-
ployee trust. In the latter case, the presumption is that workers are less likely than mutual fund
portfolio managers to sell out management. See, e.g., Comment, Employee Stock Ownership Plans
and Corporate Takeovers: Restraints on the Use of ESOPs by Corporate Officers and Directors to
Avert Hostile Takeovers, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 731, 733 (1983); Rosen and Caudell-Feagan, Us-
ing ESOP's to Thwart Hostile Takeovers-Beware!, PENZSION WORLD, Feb. 1984, at 18, 18-20.
Public companies also sell off divisions or subsidiaries which fail to meet corporate targets for
growth and profitability. Employees are typically most interested in these so-called distress buyouts
when the operations provide substantial employment in the local community. The $368 million
buyout of the aging Weirton Steel plant from National Steel is the leading example. See, e.g., Kutt-
ner, Blue-Collar Boardrooms, NEw REPUBLIC, June 17, 1985, at 18, 21-22. Other ESOP uses in-
clude the refinancing of existing pension plans or general corporate refinancing. See, e.g., Companies,
supra note 5, at 2. See generally Sherman & Lewis, The ESOP Fallacy, 3 J. PENSION PLAN. &
COMPLIANCE 226, 234-44 (1977) (skeptical analysis of thirteen transactions said to be well-suited to
ESOP financing). A novel, and as yet untried, use of the leveraged ESOP is as the vehicle supporting
a hostile takeover raid.
6. Employee ownership has been promoted, inter alia, as (1) the means to "restructure the shop
floor and guide the flow of capital, technology, and human resources into more creative systems of
self-management;" (2) "early evidence of a coming Second Industrial Revolution. . . characterised by
participation and ownership of the means of production;" (3) the vehicle for fulfillment of "responsi-
ble social justice in America." Woodworth, Towards a Labour-Owned Economy in the United States,
6 LAB. & Soc'y 41, 43 (1981); and (4) as an "attractive and practical 'third way' between market
capitalism and state socialism." C. Rosen & W. Whyte, Encouraging Employee Ownership: The Gov-
ernment's Role (Nov. 1983), reprinted in NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, A LEG-
ISLATIVE GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIp 46 (1984).
More immediate ends to be achieved by employee ownership range from increased worker control,
see, e.g., Krimerman, Gathering Strength: Worker Ownership and Control in the 80's. CHANGING
WORK, Fall 1984, at 20, 25 (1984); to resurgent trade unionism, Kuttner, supra note 5, at 23; job
preservation, Olson, Union Experiences With Worker Ownership: Legal and Practical Issues Raised
by ESOPS, TRASOPS, Stock Purchases and Cooperatives, 1982 Wis. L. REV 729, 742-760; and
even a "centerpiece" role in defeating hostile takeover bids, Blumstein, New Role for Employee Plans,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1985, at D1, col. 3. In such an environment, the observation that ESOPs,
whether leveraged or unleveraged, represent an allocation of compensation between current and de-
ferred accounts is easily forgotten. See infra note 30.
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employee ownership programs and subsidies as an integral part of local
economic development initiatives.
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This Note analyzes leveraged employee buyouts as a core application of
the leveraged ESOP program.' These buyouts highlight the contention of
Congress that leveraged employee ownership can boost productivity,
transfer wealth without expropriation or tax redistribution, and transform
workers into capitalists.9
This Note argues that both the premise and the structure of leveraged
7. Twelve states have passed laws endorsing the concept of employee ownership and/or providing
direct aid for technical and financial assistance: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Mary-
land, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Wiscon-
sin. See generally NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, supra note 6, at II-1 to II-10
(describing legislation in 10 states); National Center for Employee Ownership, Wisconsin Legislation
Encourages Employee Ownership, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, Apr. 1985, at 5; National Center for Em-
ployee Ownership, Connecticut Sets up Employee Ownership Fund, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, June
1985, at 8. Under the Pennsylvania program, loans and loan guarantees will be provided to support
employee buyouts for firms "facing a threat of substantial layoffs or a plant closing." Employee-
Ownership-Assistance Program, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 396.5(a)-(b) (Purdon Supp. 1985). This
provision reflects the belief that "employee ownership . . . can successfully prevent a plant shut-
down." DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, PENNSYLVANIA Eco-
NOMIC REVITALIZATION FUND 1 (Nov. 1984). In addition, the program provides loans for technical
assistance "to develop or improve an employee-owned enterprise." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 396.4(a)
(Purdon Supp. 1985). This provision reflects the belief that "employee ownership can lead to in-
creased productivity and profitability." DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COMMONWEATH OF PENNSYL-
VANIA, supra, at 1.
8. A leveraged buyout refers to a financing transaction in which a buyer borrows funds secured by
the assets and earning power of the acquisition target in order to purchase control of the corporation
from selling shareholders. When the leveraged ESOP structure is used as part of the financing pack-
age, the transaction is known as a leveraged employee buyout.
To avoid confusion, two types of employee buyouts need to be distinguished. In the buyout of
healthy companies, management and investors direct the proportion of stock to be owned by workers
in the ESOP trust. As fiduciaries of the trust, management executives will generally control voting
rights of the ESOP stock for at least as long as the buyout debt is outstanding. See infra note 76. Only
in buyouts of distressed companies will workers end up with all the stock, principally because in these
cases other investors have little interest in buying the firm. See Kuttner, supra note 5, at 22; M.
KIESCHNICH, J. PARZEN, C. ROSEN, & C. SQUIRE, EMPLOYEE BuYouT HANDBOOK 5-8a (1985)
(description of employee buyouts as an alternative to plant closing). Despite the sharp divergence of
form, both transactions are generally referred to as employee buyouts.
The first administratively sanctioned use of debt as applied to an employee pension plan was the
leveraging of a defined contribution plan allowed in a 1953 IRS revenue ruling. Granados, Employee
Stock Ownership Plans: An Analysis of Current Reform Proposals, 14 J. L. REFORM 15, 18-19
(1980) (citing Rev. Rul. 46, 1953-1 C.B. 287). The first application of the leveraged ESOP buyout
occurred in 1956 when a small newspaper averted a takeover by a major chain. Id.
Recent major leveraged employee buyouts include Blue Bell, the manufacturer of Wrangler jeans
(sale price of $470 million), Wall St. J., July 25, 1984, at 5, col. 1; Parsons Corporation, an engineer-
ing firm ($557 million), Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1984, at 12, col. 4; Weirton Steel ($386 million), Wall
St. J., Sept. 26, 1983, at 16, col. 3; Raymond International ($165 million), Wall St. J., Nov. 10, 1983,
at 22, col. 1; and Dan River ($154 million), Wall St. J., May 25, 1983, at 10, col. 2.
The stirring rhetoric and tangible tax benefits from Congress presage a continuing rise in popular-
ity for the employee buyout. In the words of a union official at a major airline, "'there probably isn't
an employee intensive corporation in America that isn't thinking about [a leveraged worker buyout]."'
Wail St. J., Feb. 21, 1985, at 24, col. 2. T. Boone Pickens, Chairman of Mesa Petroleum, stated to
the press that the leveraged employee buyout has the potential to "'financially restructure America."'
Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1984, at 20, col. 2.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 43-52.
Leveraged ESOPs
ESOPs are fatally defective. After placing the program in the setting of
tax and pension law, the Note in Part I identifies the principal arguments
supporting leveraged ESOPs. Part II analyzes these arguments using
modern financial theory and finds them wanting. Part III offers evidence
that the program systematically injures workers and the economy as a
whole. The Note concludes by suggesting that the program is costly,
harmful, and unnecessary, and should be abolished. Instead, Congress
should rely on individual firms to decide without the bias of tax subsidies
whether to invest worker assets in employer securities.
I. THE CONGRESSIONAL PROGRAM
A. The Statutory Setting
A brief guide to pension law as applied to a leveraged ESOP transac-
tion sets the context for analyzing the congressional program and the asso-
ciated tax subsidies.10 The term "ESOP" refers generically to a statutory
pension program that invests primarily in employer stock."1 As one of sev-
10. There is a modest literature explaining the ESOP concept and assessing its significance as an
employee benefit. For discussion of statutes and implementing regulations, see KAPLAN & LUDWIG,
supra note 2 (analysis of ESOPs and leveraged ESOPs); Subcommittee on Employee Stock Owner-
ship Plans, Committee on Employee Benefits, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, ESOPs
Foibles, 31 TAx LAW. 561, 561-613 (1978) (general discussion of ESOP program); Menke, ESOP's
New Look Under the Final Regulations, 5 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 213, 213-38 (1979)
(description of IRS regulation of ESOPs); Ludwig & Curtis, ESOPs Made SubstantialyMore At-
tractive as a Result of Economic Recovery Tax Act 55 J. TAX'N 208, 208-11 (1981) (explanation of
increased ESOP benefits under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981).
For generally favorable evaluations of ESOPs and their potential, see Altmann, The ESOP Revis-
ited: A Reinterpretation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 5 J. PENSION PLAN & COMPLIANCE
160, 160-67 (1979) (ESOPs can increase returns on invested capital and are superior to profit-
sharing); Granados, supra note 8 (historical background and analysis of proposed legislative reforms);
Olson, supra note 6 (broad review of organized labor use of employee ownership structures, including
ESOPs).
For articles skeptical of ESOP benefits, both financial and economic, see Kaplan, ESOP's Fable, 53
TAXES 898, 898-912 (1975) (equivalent or superior results achievable through non-ESOP planning
techniques); Carlson, ESOP and Universal Capitalism, 31 TAx L. REv. 289, 299-300, 312-15
(1976) (ESOP forces loss of diversification and amounts to program of redistribution, not wealth
creation); Sherman & Lewis, supra note 5 (skeptical analysis of ESOP applications).
11. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983) and parallel
governing provisions under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, at I.R.C. §§ 401-409
and other scattered provisions (West Supp. 1985)).
Under ERISA, an ESOP is defined as a tax-qualified stock bonus plan that is designed to invest
primarily in "qualifying employee [sic] securities" and that meets "such other requirements as the
Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe by regulation." ERISA § 407(d)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6)
(1982). Under the Internal Revenue Code, an ESOP is strictly defined as an employee stock bonus
plan, or a combination of a stock bonus and money purchase plan, which meets special regulatory and
statutory provisions relating to its operation and holding of stock. I.R.C. § 4975(e) (7)-(8) (West
Supp. 1985); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11, T.D. 7571, 1979-1 C.B. 368, 368-70.
As a defined contribution plan, the ESOP credits contributions to individual employee accounts
such that future benefits depend upon the return earned by the employer stock and other invested
securities. I.R.C. § 411 (i) (1982). In the alternative form of pension plan authorized under the Code,
the defined benefit plan, retirement benefits are defined in advance rather than tied to actual perform-
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eral "eligible individual account plans,"'1 2 the ESOP is exempt from the
general requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) that pension plans be diversified,"3 and that no more than
10 percent of the plan's assets be invested in employer stock.14 In addition,
the ESOP is exempt from the general prohibition against transactions be-
tween a pension plan and the sponsoring corporation.
1 5
In the simplest case, an employer will establish an ESOP trust and
thereafter make annual contributions to the trust in the form of employer
stock. The corporation can deduct the contribution, but the value of the
stock is not included in the income of the employee until withdrawal. 6
The tax-free accumulation of investment income in the pension fund rep-
ance. I.R.C. § 4110) (1982).
The first statutory discussion of employee ownership appeared in the Regional Rail Reorganization
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, §§ 102(5), 301(e), 87 Stat. 985, 987, 1005 (1974) (prior to 1976
amendment). The principal legislation subsequent to ERISA appears in the Trade Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-618, § 273(0, 88 Stat. 1978, 2038-39 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2373(0 (1982))
(preferential loan guarantees to ESOP firms injured by foreign competition); Tax Reduction Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 301, 89 Stat. 26, 36-40 (tax-credit ESOP) (repealed 1984); Revenue Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, §§ 141-43, 92 Stat. 2763, 2787-96 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 409 (West Supp. 1985) and in other scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (adding technical qualifications
for ESOPs); Small Business Employee Ownership Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-302, §§ 501-07, 94
Stat. 833, 850-54 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 632(c), 636(a)(15) (1982)) (SBA loan
guarantees for purchase of employer stock by ESOP trust resulting in majority ownership by trust);
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 331-339, 95 Stat. 172, 289-298
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 41, 404(a)(9) (West Supp. 1985) and in other scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.) (creating ESOP credit and raising deductible limit on employer pension contri-
butions from 15% to 25% of payroll costs); and the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-369, §§ 541-545, 98 Stat. 494, 887-96 (codified at 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1042, 404(k), 133, 2210, 4978
(West Supp. 1985)) (tax-free rollover, dividend deduction, interest exclusion, assumption of estate tax
liability, and excise tax on certain dispositions).
For a legislative history of the ESOP program, see Granados, supra note 8, at 18-20. For a discus-
sion of other ERTA provisions affecting ESOPs, see Ludwig & Curtis, supra note 10. For a discus-
sion of provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 that affect ESOPs, see Vogel & Rosen, Myriad
of New Tax Incentives Allowed for ESOPs, Legal Times, July 23, 1984, at 12, col. 1.
12. ERISA § 407(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(3) (1982) (defining "eligible individual account
plan," which includes profit-sharing, stock bonus, thrift, savings, ESOP, or money purchase pension
plans).
13. ERISA § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (1982) (exempting an individual eligible account
plan from diversification requirement for purposes of acquiring and holding qualifying employer real
property or securities). Under ERISA, fiduciaries are required to diversify plan investments to mini-
mize the risk of large losses, unless clearly imprudent. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C.
§1104(a)(1)(C) (1982).
14. ERISA § 407(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(b)(1) (1982). Under ERISA, a pension plan may not
invest more than 10% of the fair market value of its assets in qualifying employer securities and real
property. ERISA § 407(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2) (1982).
15. ERISA § 408(e)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e)(3)(A) (1982) and I.R.C. § 4975(d)(13) (1982)
(acquisition, sale, or lease exemption); ERISA § 408(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(3) (1982) (leveraged
ESOP loan exemption). Ordinarily, transactions between a plan and "a party in interest" (i.e., the
sponsoring corporation) are prohibited, ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. 1106 (1982), subject to certain ex-
emptions, ERISA § 408, 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (1982).
16. See A. MuNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 35-36 (1982).
Leveraged ESOPs
resents a subsidy authorized by Congress for all pension saving plans,
ESOP and non-ESOP alike.17
Beyond this general subsidy to pension plans, ESOPs benefit from vari-
ous additional tax subsidies, including a corporate deduction for dividends
paid on ESOP stock 8 and the assumption of estate tax liability by the
ESOP.1' Non-tax benefits include eligibility for Small Business Adminis-
tration loan guarantees, 20 preference for government loans to ESOP firms
injured by foreign competition," and increased allowable pension alloca-
tions to individual accounts.22
Finally, in addition to these benefits conferred on pension plans and
ESOPs in general, the leveraged ESOP has the statutory right to finance
the trust stock purchase with debt.2 By conferring this unique right of
17. This Note does not challenge this subsidy to pension plans generally. The size of the subsidy
attributable to pension fund taxation has been estimated to be as high as $56 billion annually. Good-
man & Harpham, Toward Real Pension Security, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1985, at 34, col. 3. It is
commonly asserted that the source of the subsidy consists of two principal elements-the ability to
invest pretax income (i.e., an employer realizes an immediate deduction, but the employee can defer
the payment of tax until withdrawal from the pension fund and therefore invest pretax money in the
interim) and the right to earn a return on funds that would otherwise have been paid in current taxes.
See A. MUNNELL, supra note 16, at 36. The former element, however, is incorrectly identified as a
subsidy. The government generally receives identical aggregate taxes whether income is immediately
taxed or allowed to compound at pretax rates and then taxed on the compounded value. See Halperin,
Avoiding Taxation by Disguising Interest: The "Time Value of Money", 95 YALE L. J. (forthcom-
ing). Alternatively stated, if pension funds were taxable, the advantage of qualified plans would disap-
pear even though the employer's deduction precedes the employee's inclusion. Id. The sole source of
the subsidy is the ability to earn interest on untaxed income in a tax-free account. The amount of the
subsidy rises exponentially as a function of years invested and the applicable interest rate. Thus, it is
due to compounding that the pension subsidy approaches $56 billion. For a mathematical expression
of the subsidy, see Sunley, Employee Benefits and Transfer Payments, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
TAXATnON 75, 77 n.5 (J. Pechman, ed. 1977). It should also be noted that individuals receiving
retirement payments can roll over the funds into an Individual Retirement Account, the financial
effect of which is to extend the compounded value of the subsidy. I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)-(7) (West. Supp.
1985).
18. I.R.C. § 404(k) (West Supp. 1985).
19. I.R.C. § 2210(b) (West Supp. 1985). An additional tax benefit, newly granted under the
Deficit Reduction Tax Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 541, 98 Stat. 494, 887-90, allows a
shareholder to reinvest tax-free the proceeds from the sale of non-publicly-traded stock to an ESOP,
provided the funds are reinvested within twelve months and the ESOP holds at least 30% of all
employer securities. I.R.C. § 1042(a) (West Supp. 1985). This provision may not be a subsidy since it
eliminates a bias in the tax code. That is, shareholders can obtain non-recognition treatment of gains
through a reorganization. The ESOP rollover provision grants equal tax status to the sale of stock to
employees. But the provision gives selling shareholders an incentive to favor bids by an employer-
controlled ESOP over other investors, which leads to a distortion in the market for corporate control.
See R. Doernberg & J. Macey, ESOPs and Market Distortions 49-51 (July 23, 1985) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the author).
20. Small Business Employee Ownership Act of 1980, §§ 503-505, 15 U.S.C. §§ 632(c),
636(a)(15) (1982).
21. Trade Act of 1974, § 273(f, 19 U.S.C. § 2373(0 (1982).
22. I.R.C. § 415(c)(6) (1982). Under specified conditions, the normal dollar limitation on annual
pension allocation to an individual doubles for an ESOP to $60,000 (but may not exceed 25% of
employee compensation).
23. ESOPs are the only pension plan permitted to borrow from a party-in interest (i.e., the spon-
soring corporation) for the purchase of employer stock. ERISA § 408(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(3)
(1982). To qualify for the ERISA loan exemption:
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 95: 148, 1985
leverage, Congress transforms the ESOP from a retirement account into a
"technique of corporate finance,"24 of which the leveraged employee
buyout is the leading example.
In a typical leveraged employee buyout,25 the corporation borrows
funds from a bank2 to buy the outstanding shares held by existing share-
holders. In turn, the leveraged ESOP trust exchanges a note for a propor-
tion of the stock. The balance of the equity is owned by management and
outsiders.27
(a) the ESOP must satisfy the statutory definition of ERISA § 407(d)(6), [I.R.C.] § 4975(e)(7)
and IRS regulations;
(b) the loan must be primarily for the benefit of participants;
(c) the interest rate must be reasonable; and
(d) any collateral given by the ESOP to a party in interest must be limited to qualifying
employer securities.
J. KAPLAN & R. LUDWIG, supra note 2, at A-14 (footnote omitted).
24. "ERISA made it clear that the ESOP is a technique of corporate finance ... " Long State-
ment, supra note 2, at S16636. See also Rev. Rul. 79-122, 1979-1 C.B. 204, 206 (IRS acceptance of
ESOPs as corporate finance technique).
The legislative history of the ESOP program frequently refers to the connection between ESOPs
and corporate finance. In part, these references serve the interest of congressional sponsors wishing to
promote ESOPs as a device suited to the broadest range of corporate activity. See Long Statement,
supra note 2, at S16638 ("The Versatile ESOP").
Two more political reasons for the link can be inferred. First, Senator Long introduced ESOPs
under the governing authority of ERISA as a matter of legislative practicality. See Granados, supra
note 8, at 19-20. The emphasis on corporate finance separates ESOPs as much as possible from the
traditional ERISA concern of protecting retirement assets. For the results of this uneasy marriage, see
text accompanying notes 35-42.
Second, the phrase seeks to institutionalize the intellectual lineage of the program owing to Louis
Kelso, whose theory of capitalism rests on the proposition that access to credit is the key to unlocking
prosperity and encouraging equitable wealth distribution. See generally L. KELSO & M. ADLER, THE
CAPITALIST MANIFESTO 224-42 (1958) (exposition of basic theory); L. KELSO & P. HErrER, Two-
FACTOR THEORY: THE ECONOMICS OF REALITY 45-47 (1967) (same).
As a practical matter, this Note questions the ability of the designated ESOP regulators, the De-
partment of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service, to void abusive ESOP transactions when the
language defining permissible structures is as vague and open-ended as "technique of corporate fi-
nance." Since innumerable financing transactions crafted by capable lawyers will presumptively meet
this test, Congress invites a notoriously skilled bar to exploit ESOP tax subsidies for unintended
purposes. Limited staffing at the Department of Labor strongly suggests that these transactions will
overwhelm governmental oversight capabilities, particularly given the complexity that financing ar-
rangements are capable of achieving.
25. See supra note 8.
26. The ESOP trust can borrow money directly from lenders, but in practice banks prefer to
proceed against the corporation as borrower in the event of default. Qualified lenders are specified as
a bank, an insurance company, or "a corporation actively engaged in the business of lending money."
I.R.C. § 133(a) (West Supp. 1985). It is reasonable to speculate that investment banks and finance/
leasing firms will devise elaborate syndication agreements designed to pass through the advantage of
exempt interest on ESOP loans to high bracket taxpayers.
27. For example, in the 1983 Dan River buyout, employees were allocated approximately 70% of
the outstanding equity, DAN RIvER INC., PROXY STATEMENT AND NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING
21 (Apr. 28, 1983), whereas the buyout of American Sterilizer Company utilized a so-called inflatable
leveraged ESOP where workers owned no stock immediately subsequent to the buyout, but at the
discretion of the new owners (i.e., management) may be offered new equity at a later date. AMERICAN
STERILIZER Co., OFFER TO PURCHASE 11-12 (Nov. 9, 1984). Equity ownership per se, however,
does not insure worker satisfaction. See Hoerr, supra note 3, at 97 (noting dissatisfaction of Dan
River employees with structure of the buyout).
Leveraged ESOPs
Subsequent to the buyout, the corporation makes annual cash pension
contributions to the trust. The trust then immediately returns the funds to
the corporation to repay the ESOP note, and the corporation in turn re-
pays to the bank the acquisition debt of the buyout. The result is that
employees finance their acquisition of company stock with funds borrowed
by the corporation and repaid with firm earnings that have been chan-
nelled through the trust as pension contributions.28
Funding repayments through the trust thus permits the firm to repay
debt with pretax income in the form of a deductible pension contribution.
Alternatively stated, the leveraged ESOP structure allows the corporation
to borrow money and, upon repayment, deduct principal (up to 25% of
payroll costs) and interest (without limitation).29 Whether such a provi-
sion constitutes a subsidy is a debatable but usually incorrectly analyzed
issue.30
Employee buyouts are not limited to the purchase of distressed firms. See supra note 8. The pro-
gram constitutes a pure financing instrument available to all corporations, including Fortune 500
companies. The critique of this Note is directed at healthy companies capable of using these tax
benefits, presumably the firms that Congress most wants workers to own. To the extent congressional
and state authorities determine that plant closings and the obligation owed workers in dying industries
require special legislation, the umbrella coverage of the leveraged ESOP is an inefficient and im-
proper form of redress.
28. The ESOP shares are initially held in a suspense account. Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11(c)
(1977). With each annual repayment from the ESOP to the sponsoring corporation, a proportionate
number of shares is released from the suspense account. For two qualifying methods of releasing
securities from encumbrance, see Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(8)(i)-(iii) (1977). The released shares
are allocated to individual employees based substantially on compensation. From the date of alloca-
tion, the shares are further subject to a vesting schedule that can extend as long as fifteen years. I.R.C.§ 411 (1982). See also J. KAPLAN & R. LUDWIG, supra note 2, at A-9 (discussing fifteen year vesting
period). Departure from the firm prior to vesting results in forfeiture of the unvested shares.
Under the ESOP structure, an employee can receive a cash payment in one of two ways. First, the
corporation is required to repurchase vested shares from departing employees when there is no availa-
ble public market, with the purchase price determined by annual appraisal. I.R.C. § 409(h) (West.
Supp. 1985). Alternatively, the employees will be paid pro rata in the event the company is sold.
29. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(9) (West. Supp. 1985). All other eligible individual account plans are
generally limited to a 15% corporate deduction, subject to carryovers. I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A) (1982).
The ESOP deduction can be applied in addition to deductions taken under other eligible individual
account plans. Id.
30. Measurement of a subsidy requires comparision to an alternative normative structure. See
supra note 3. Pension practitioners have long recognized that cash flow effects equivalent to the
ESOP principal deduction can be achieved with the combination of debt and a stock bonus plan. See,
e.g., Vogel & Rosen, supra note 11, at 12, 19.
The difficult, and to some extent unanswerable, question is whether the debt plus stock bonus plan
alternative represents the proper incremental comparison for purposes of measuring the repayment
provision. A leveraged ESOP is a hybrid of debt (i.e., borrowing against corporate assets) and equity(i.e., sale of stock to employees through a pension trust). The debt or leveraging capacity of the ESOP
trust accounts for the corporate finance applications. The equity sale to employees represents the
allocation of pension assets.
The debt/equity distinction explains the underlying reason for the debt plus stock bonus plan
equivalence. The transaction simply divides in two the implicit instruments of the leveraged ESOP
transaction. Moreover, the distinction underscores that employee ownership of company stock equals
the value of pension contributions made by the corporation to the trust. Unless one assumes that
workers receive a pay increase simply for agreeing to accept a pension contribution in employer stock
instead of cash, then employee share ownership represents a portfolio selection. In other words, work-
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Banks and other "qualified lenders" have, as an undeniable subsidy,
the right to exclude from income 50% of the interest earned on an ESOP
loan.31 This provision alone may reduce financing costs to the borrowing
corporation by as much as one-third.
3 2
In short, the leveraged ESOP enjoys three layers of tax subsidy, first as
a pension plan, second as a qualifying ESOP, and third as a tax-ad-
vantaged debt instrument. The critique in this Note focuses on the second
and third subsidies 3 that Congress has bestowed on the acquisition and
financing of employer stock by employees."
B. The Political Setting
Stock ownership confers two general entitlements: one to residual cash
flows, the other to a vote in the political governance of the firm. These
rights are broadly distinguished by the contrast between ownership and
control. Congressional sponsors of the leveraged ESOP program justify
the legislation primarily as a means for workers to accumulate a capital
estate (i.e., ownership).3 5 Yet under elaborate ERISA fiduciary obliga-
tions administered by the Department of Labor, management, as the
ESOP trustee, must act solely in the interest of plan participants, in a
prudent fashion, and for the exclusive benefit of the employees and their
beneficiaries."6
ers invest pension contributions in employer stock that would otherwise have been available for invest-
ment in the capital market.
Few if any leveraged buyouts are reported to have used the bonus plan alternative. To the extent
the bonus plan is not a viable alternative, or is itself an improper subsidy, the ESOP repayment
provision likely constitutes a subsidy.
The debt/stock bonus strategy also is no longer a comparable alternative given the subsidies which
are unique to the leveraged ESOP structure, especially the subsidy granted to ESOP lenders. See, e.g.,
Vogel & Rosen, supra note 11, at 12.
Perhaps most important is whether the leveraged ESOP structure allocates a larger fraction of total
employee compensation to pension savings than would otherwise be available under comparable alter-
natives. This would require a complex examination of, inter alia, tax-deferral alternatives available
through the overfunding of defined benefit plans and the use of so-called 401(k) plans, which permit
salary income to be exchanged for tax-deferred savings, subject to limitations. I.R.C. § 401(k) (West
Supp. 1985). Lastly, the leveraged ESOP structure may well force workers to retain more investment
in deferred pension income than they find desirable, violating their time preference for money and
their level of desired total portfolio risk.
31. I.R.C. § 133 (West Supp. 1985).
32. See Vogel & Rosen, supra note 11, at 12.
33. While this Note does not challenge the general policy of subsidising pension plans, the ESOP
structure may permit an excess of funds to be tax-sheltered. See supra note 30.
34. The reason for eliminating subsidies not exclusively related to leverage follows from the anal-
ysis of this Note. Subsidizing ownership plans, whether leveraged or unleveraged, does not generate
wealth, see text accompanying notes 54-62, reduces diversification, see text accompanying notes
83-84, and pays corporations to behave as they would otherwise if the incentives operate as presumed
by ESOP proponents, see text accompanying notes 73-81.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 43-45.
36. See 44 Fed. Reg. 50367, 50369 (1978) (Department of Labor statement that an ESOP trans-
action does not void general fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA § 404).
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The high standard of fiduciary care mandated by ERISA underscores
the interest in ESOPs as a means to transfer control of the workplace to
the employees.37 In particular, advocates of workplace democracy seek full
voting power for employee-held stock, which would include the right to
elect the board of directors and thereby set management policy."8 More
broadly, workplace advocates attack as subversive of the underlying par-
ticipatory ideal key aspects of the current ESOP regime that operate to
entrench management.3 9
The conflict between worker ownership and control represents a politi-
cal contest of a basic order.40 Yet Congress never authorized ESOPs as a
vehicle for the fundamental restructuring of political power in the econ-
omy.41 Furthermore, tying worker control to the flawed economics of the
37. See, e.g., Williams, Buyouts Made with ESOPs are Criticized, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1984, at
35, col. 3 (citing Corey Rosen, executive director of the National Center for Employee Ownership:
"ESOPs are supposed to be used for the exclusive benefit of employees .... If management uses
them in any way, they should make a very strong case that the plans are for the interests of
workers").
38. See, e.g., Ellerman, Theory of Legal Structure: Worker Cooperatives, 18 J. ECON. ISSUES
861, 873 (1984) ("The democratic principle of self-government implies that the direct control rights,
mainly the voting rights to elect the firm's board of directors, should be assigned to the functional role
of being governed, that is, to the people working in the firm." (citation omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Hoerr, supra note 3, at 95 (citing Joseph Blasi, leader of a Harvard University
study group on worker ownership: "All too frequently . . . companies [with non-employee-voting
ESOPs] refuse to use employee ownership to its fullest potential by giving employees real ownership
rights and practical and useful participation in the company.").
40. Political advocacy of employee ownership typically takes the form of a contrast between gen-
eral democratic rights and limited economic rights. See, e.g., Kuttner, supra note 5, at 23 ("The
worker may be a full-fledged citizen in the political arena, but as an industrial worker he has no more
rights over property than a medieval serf."). The rhetorical appeal to democracy, fundamental prop-
erty rights and the principles of capitalism highlights the effort to establish employee ownership as a
political movement contesting core values. "Worker ownership offers the prospect of extending citizen-
style rights to the workplace by radically democratizing the principles of capitalism rather than by
hobbling them." Id. See also Ellerman, supra note 38.
41. If Congress genuinely intended the ESOP program to reorder the structure and practice of
capitalism in the United States, it is improbable that the legislative debate would have been character-
ized by the observation that: "Until now, employee ownership has met with no opposition in Con-
gress." Hoerr, supra note 3, at 96. Nor would the program operate through the narrow, technical
scope of retirement and tax law. Moreover, program lobbyists admit that the ESOP subsidies in the
Deficit Reduction Tax Act of 1984 were obtained in large measure because of the program's "low
visibility." Address by Luis Granados, former Legislative Counsel to ESOP Association of America,
at the Conference on Employee Ownership, Apr. 26, 1985 (on file with author). Specifically, the 1984
ESOP provisions were described as ones perceived not to "affect that big a sector of the economy and
[that] frankly [the public does not] have much input in." Id.
The effectiveness of the ESOP lobbying effort is especially noteworthy given that the Deficit Re-
duction Tax Act of 1984 was passed to raise revenue. The deal struck by Senator Long involved an
agreement to delay for one year a scheduled increase in tax credits offered to a specialized form of
ESOP, known commonly as a payroll-based ESOP or PAYSOP. The delay was estimated by the
Conference Committee to save $2.1 billion over three years, while the new subsidy provisions in the
Deficit Reduction Act would cost an estimated $400 million. Senator Long was thus able to secure
passage of long-sought employee ownership benefits by trading one subsidy for another. Id.
Ironically, the PAYSOP program so lacks in merit that even ESOP advocates deride or minimize
its significance. Louis Kelso, for example, calls the program "a government giveaway." Hoerr, supra
note 3, at 96. Legislation built on the exchange of suspect subsidies lays small claim to implementing
fundamental reform of the economic system.
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leveraged ESOP program risks discrediting profound workplace experi-
ments now underway in the U.S.4
C. The Rationale
The legislative record indicates that Congress established the leveraged
ESOP program to address perceived inequities in the distribution of capi-
tal in the American economy.43 The principal architect of the program,
Senator Russell Long, argues that America has only a "scanty sprinkling
of capitalists," 44 each with highly concentrated capital ownership. Such
concentration, according to Long, fundamentally weakens the economy.
New wealth flows to those who are already wealthy while "[m]ost work-
ing Americans owe rather than own [and] accumulate debts rather than
assets."
'45
According to Congress,46 the introduction of new technology magnifies
the costs to society. Workers steadily lose jobs to machines, with each new
round of investment putting the American worker at a greater
47
To avoid these consequences, program sponsors argue that the govern-
ment must redirect the flow of capital from current owners. Congress
claims that at least eight distinct benefits will stem from the expanded
ownership of capital: 1) new wealth and productivity for the economy, 2)
a chance for workers to accumulate a capital estate, 3) more jobs, 4) re-
duced fiscal strain, 5) a principled foreign policy, 6) union-management
cooperation, 7) preservation of the marginal enterprise, and 8) expanded
consumer purchasing power to "irrigate the economy."4
The principal means by which the ESOP program is claimed to achieve
these objectives can be briefly summarized. First, Congress asserts that
access to subsidized financing creates wealth for the employees. This argu-
ment relies on a model of project finance in which a firm identifies a
valuable investment opportunity, such as the construction of a new plant.
Corporate borrowing through the ESOP finances the facility. The plant
42. See, e.g., J. HACKMAN & G. OLDHAM, WORK REDESIGN 161-90 (1980) (advocating estab-
lishment of self-managing work groups as the basic unit of more effective enterprise production).
43. "A continuing fundamental weakness of our system is that so many Americans own so very
little while a relative few Americans own a great deal." Long Statement, supra note 2, at S16630. In
the balance of this Note, congressional purpose is equated with the Long Statement because 1) it is
the most recent and complete expression of the intent underlying the ESOP program, 2) the floor
statement was cosponsored by 46 Senate colleagues, 3) no additional floor debate was reported in the
House or Senate regarding Long's testimony, and 4) the views are consistent with prior legislation.
44. Id.
45. Id. at S16634.
46. See supra note 43.
47. Id. at S16633.
48. Id. at S16630-35.
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generates the cash required to repay the ESOP loan and continues on "to
generate purchasing power for [the] owners," who are now working
Americans, instead of the already wealthy capitalist elite.49
Second, Congress states that fairness and equity require the program as
the means to distribute future wealth over a broader base. In a capital
intensive economy a just return to labor is said to include more than com-
pensation "for work done."' 0 According to Congress, workers should also
benefit from the returns to capital achievable through stock ownership.
Proponents of ESOPs advocate that the nation's taxing structure is the
appropriate mechanism to redress the inequitable concentration of wealth
in the U.S. economy.51
Third, Congress accepts as fact that increased ownership improves pro-
ductivity, citing empirical studies showing higher productivity and im-
proved financial performance for worker-owned versus non-worker-owned
firms. The supporting intuition suggests that employees work harder
when they are shareholders.52
Because adoption of the leveraged ESOP program implicates the funda-
mental organization and values of the U.S. economy, these arguments
merit close scrutiny.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL PROGRAM
This Section of the Note analyzes the three justifications for leveraged
ESOPs53 and concludes that each is unpersuasive.
A. Debt Does Not Create Value
Contrary to the claims of leveraged ESOP proponents, financing em-
ployee stock purchases with debt will not increase employee wealth. Sena-
tor Russell Long equates access to debt financing with new wealth crea-
tion for workers." This Note maintains that Senator Long's argument,
49. Id. at S16634.
50. Id. at S16632.
51. Id.
52. Id. at S16631.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
54. "ESOP financing involves access to credit for the financing of assets which are calculated togenerate earnings with which to repay the debt ... and which can then go on to generate purchasing
power for their owners . . . ." Id. at S16634. Senator Long explains the logic of ESOP financing
with the example of a corporation seeking to build a new plant for $10 million. With traditional
financing, the corporation will borrow the money, backed by adequate collateral, and then "utilize the
income generated by the new plant to repay the loan." Id. at S16637. According to Long, the ESOP
financing simply adds a third party, the ESOP trust, which uses the borrowed funds "to acquire
newly issued employer securities, and the corporation applies the funds to build its new plant." Id.
For the fallacy underlying this argument, see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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which was accepted by Congress and is central to the leveraged ESOP
program, is wrong both in theory and in practice.
Take the hypothetical example of a publicly-held company worth $100
million. Employees and management join together to take the company
private. The assets and future earning power of the firm are used as col-
lateral to raise $100 million from the bank. Proceeds of this ESOP loan
finance the purchase of the outstanding shares. There is no new plant
investment, only a firm recapitalized to the limit of cash flow with debt.
Ownership of the company is transferred, but the value of the company
remains fixed at $100 million.
Two common intuitions explain the fixed valuation. First, value is
based on productive capacity, which does not change with a transfer of
paper. Second, if debt did increase the value of a company, then all com-
panies would immediately leverage themselves; value-maximizing firms do
not leave free money lying around.
These intuitions have been incorporated into a fundamental proposition
of finance theory-in a world of perfect capital markets and no taxes,
financial structure will not affect firm value.55 While the Note will subse-
quently relax these assumptions, the starting point of public policy analy-
sis must be that debt, by itself, does not create value.
Congress, however, overlooks this fundamental proposition, and instead
views the leveraged ESOP structure as a reliable, general mechanism of
wealth creation for workers. In terms of the hypothetical $100 million
buyout, Congress is suggesting that the new company will generate, say,
$10 million a year for debt repayment, leaving the new owners free and
clear with a $100 million asset after year ten.5" Understanding the flaw in
this example is central to understanding the defect in the leveraged ESOP
program.
55. The argument is, first, that investors will not pay more for leverage than they could duplicate
themselves, and second, that the increased returns to equity are precisely offset in present value terms
by the increased riskiness of the firm's earning potential. In other words, "the market value of any
firm is independent of its capital structure .... " Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corpo-
ration Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261, 268 (1958) (emphasis omit-
ted); see also R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 355-64 (2d ed. 1984)
(basic discussion of capital structure and firm value). Given the ability to deduct interest expense in a
world of taxes, the theory has been modified to hold either- 1) that the value of a firm with debt is
increased by the present value of the tax shield (i.e., interest expense times the marginal corporate
debt rate), id. at 377-81, or 2) that the inclusion of personal tax considerations may eliminate the
value of the tax shield since equity payments are taxed at low capital gains rates whereas investment
income can create high ordinary income tax obligations, see Miller, Debt And Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261,
266-68 (1977). But see R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra, at 387 (Miller's model not completely
accepted).
56. The example assumes that the $10 million is net of all expenses, including interest. The value
of a riskless perpetuity is equal to one year's cash flow divided by the interest rate, or $10 million
divided by 10 percent, which equals $100 million. See, e.g., R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 55,
at 37.
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Congress errs by not recognizing that the value of the firm remains
unchanged through time. To be more precise, using present value analysis
and a ten percent interest rate, the ten-year $10 million annuity is worth$61 million today, and the $100 million capitalized value in year ten is
today worth $39 million. These add up to a total present value of $100
million. 57 Since the firm was initially purchased in the going-private
transaction for $100 million, the workers realize no return.
The economic import of this story, lost on Congress, is the need to dis-
tinguish between an investment decision (an activity which generates
wealth) and a financing decision (a mechanism of payment). 51 Extending
credit to workers, the basis of the leveraged ESOP program, is a financial,
not an investment, undertaking. Thus, it is clear that the leveraged ESOP
program, as a mechanism of finance, will not generate the wealth prom-
ised by Congress.5" Its justification must rest on other grounds.
57. Present value, the basis of modem financial theory, in simplest form states that all investments
should be evaluated relative to returns which can be obtained in the marketplace. This so-called
opportunity cost of capital, here assumed to be 10 percent, can be used to translate future dollars into
equivalent present-value dollars. According to the basic formulas, a ten-year annuity of $10 million is
equivalent to receiving $61 million at time zero, while analogously a lump sum of $100 million inyear ten is today worth $39 million, assuming a ten percent discount rate. Id. at 10-13, 26-40. Thepoint of the example can thus be summarized by saying that workers, in order to pay off $100 million
of current debt, will have to give the creditors all the proceeds of the firm from now to infinity.
58. Financing theory recognizes that an investment decision may interact with the financing deci-
sion under some circumstances. For example, a new capital investment may increase the amount a
firm can borrow. See id. at 408-12. But such interactions are not involved in selecting the method offinancing an acquisition once the purchase price is fixed. In other words, "If capital markets are
efficient, then purchase or sale of any security at the prevailing market price is a zero-NPV [net
present value] transaction." Id. at 265 (italics omitted).
59. Leveraged ESOP buyouts are sometimes defended based on the comparison to conventional
buyouts. See, e.g., Letter from Louis Kelso to the Wall Street Journal (April 15, 1985) (on file with
the author). In both instances, runs the argument, debt is assumed, so that the only issue is whether
the owners will be the workers or outside investors. ESOP proponents argue that government policy
should affirmatively favor worker ownership. Employees are said to be the "natural shareholders" of
the firm; capital concentration in the hands of wealthy takeover practitioners is avoided; subsidies ease
cash flow repayments for the workers; and the process of broadened capital ownership is set in pro-
gress. Id.
At the outset, the argument assumes that tax policy is properly used to influence the form of corpo-
rate ownership. Since ESOP subsidies are taken in addition to the tax benefits available to conven-
tional buyouts, chiefly the interest shelter and possible increased depreciation deductions, the ESOPprogram creates a positive bias towards one method of financing. Government interference with the
market for corporate control by biasing takeover bids towards employees does not command wide
assent. See R. Doernberg & J. Macey, supra note 19, at 45-48.
Moreover, economists now suggest that a principal motivation for the leveraged buyout, conven-
tional or ESOP, is the attendant flexibility to reduce wage costs through layoffs, attrition and a lower
wage scale. See Frank, Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?, 74 Am. ECON. REv. 549, 567-68 (1984). The ownership stake of the ESOP buyout induces employees to accept less total compensa-
tion, in line with their productivity, than they would otherwise agree to in conventional contract
renegotiations. The ESOP structure is thus a means to restructure wage claims in a manner palatable
to workers, rather than a program of wealth creation or broadened capital ownership. While wage
restructuring forced by competitive market conditions is desirable, it is deceptive, wasteful, or both, topay employees with public tax funds to accept a reduced wage.
The more fundamental point is that buyouts take place in response to market conditions, including
perhaps careless conglomerate management, decreasing returns to scale, incorrect allocation of assets,
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B. Future Wealth Distribution-The False Premise
Congress maintains that the ESOP gives workers access to future
wealth in the economy without relying on expropriation or redistributive
taxation."0 That claim, however, ignores the well-established principle
that the purchase price paid for a firm, in an efficient market, reflects the
anticipation of future earnings discounted to a current value at an appro-
priate interest rate.Si The buyout forces the market to estimate these vari-
ables in arriving at a purchase price. Conceptually, workers, like any
buyer, will benefit in a perfect market only to the extent they can generate
unanticipated wealth subsequent to the buyout. In no sense can this unan-
ticipated wealth be equated properly with predictable future capital in-
vestment by business.62 At a basic level, the returns earned by a buyer
result from new efficiencies, managerial skill, and innovations, whereas
the anticipated return to capital investment is compounded in the present
price. The false premise besetting Congress is the notion that wealth is
available as an unclaimed commodity. In reality, workers can expect to be
compensated on their investments according to the riskiness of the project,
no more and no less.
The congressional view underlying the leveraged ESOP program thus
excess wage costs, or a desire to operate as a non-public entity. It might be true in specialized in-
stances that a firm's overriding problem is inadequate worker commitment, in which case it will be
expected that firms will efficiently recognize the importance of employee motivation programs. Stock
ownership, however, is but one among many tools available to managers and owners to increase
worker commitment. See Walton, From Control to Commitment in the Workplace, HARv. Bus. REv.,
Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 77, 79-81. When other conditions are met, such as stable cash flow and low
required investment, then a leveraged employee buyout might result. The point is that the presence of
the subsidy should not influence the decision. Nor should Congress mistake the reported large profits
on a few well-publicized deals as evidence that money is therefore being stolen from workers' pockets.
Leveraged buyouts in themselves promise no salvation. To the extent buyers overpay and fail to real-
ize planned efficiencies, the deals will prove to be losing investments. See, e.g., Deveny & Ehrlich,
Leveraged Buyouts: There's Trouble in Paradise, Bus. WK., July 22, 1985, at 112, 112-13.
Lastly, arguing that leveraged employee buyouts are good because workers get hold of a company
that otherwise would have gone to outside investors, even if true, offers no rebuttal to the general
critique of ESOPs presented in this Note. ESOP proponents, moreover, need to explain the trouble-
some fact that insofar as conventional buyouts achieve improved economic performance, it appears
that incentives given to top and line management are sufficient to generate the desired results of the
buyout.
60. Long Statement, supra note 2, at S16631-32.
61. See, e.g., R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 55, at 272 ("In an efficient market you can
trust prices. They impound all available information about the value of each security.").
62. Senator Long argues that cumulative U.S. capital expenditures between 1984 and 2000 of
approximately $2 to $5 trillion represent wealth available for distribution to workers through lever-
aged ESOP financing. Long Statement, supra note 2, at S16630. To see the fallacy here, consider a
single firm. If Senator Long's argument were valid, investors could purchase, say, IBM stock and
thereafter see their wealth increase in line with IBM capital spending. Not only would this imply that
markets were grossly inefficient (i.e., prices of securities were not reflecting readily available informa-
tion), but it would also imply that people are failing to take advantage of a near riskless opportunity
to amass fantastic wealth. In essence, Senator Long's argument repeats the confusion that future
wealth can be distributed through access to credit.
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founders on the initial premise that future wealth can be created through
access to subsidized credit. Rather, the wealth creation attributable to an
employee buyout can come from only one of three basic channels: under-
valuation, tax subsidies, and improvements in firm operations unantici-
pated in the purchase price. This Note rejects the first two sources of
potential wealth because of policy considerations and economic realities. It
rejects the third because the program embodies a flawed conception of
employee incentives.
1. Undervaluation
As a starting point, efficient market theory and supporting empirical
evidence suggest that the expectation of undervaluation makes a poor basis
for policy."3 This Note claims further that tax subsidies made available to
employees cannot be expected to compete with bids from outside investors
attracted by the promise of extraordinary investment returns. And in light
of the practical reality that management sets the terms and structure of
the deal, potential undervaluations, were they to exist, conflict with estab-
lished policy.
Public capital markets in general have been shown to do an excellent
job of pricing takeovers at their fair market value. 64 Specific empirical
evidence on this point, though somewhat ambiguous, leads to the general
conclusion that acquiring firms show no abnormal positive returns subse-
quent to an acquisition. More certainly, a benefit is captured by the sell-
ers-here the public shareholders tendering to employees and manage-
ment. 5 Second and related, in a competitive market for control of
companies, workers seeking ownership must bid against private investor
groups with substantial capital. As a result, the good buyout candi-
date-rather than outside financial capital-is today's scarce resource. 66
63. The basic tenet of efficient capital market theory is that stock prices represent "the best unbi-
ased estimate of the value of a [corporation]." Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 858 (1981).
64. See Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, HAIv. Bus. REy., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 109, 112.
Based on sixteen studies that have "painstakingly gathered evidence on the stock price effect of suc-
cessful takeovers," Jensen concludes that target company shareholders gain 30% from tenders and
20% from mergers, while the bidding companies' stock prices increase 4% from tender offers and
realize no return at all from mergers. Id. (prices "adjusted by regression analysis to eliminate the
effects of marketwide forces on all corporations"). See also Jensen & Ruback, The Market For Corpo-
rate Control: The Scientific Evidence, J. FIN. EcON., Apr. 1983, at 5, 5 (reviewing the scientific
literature and finding that, in a corporate takeover, target firm shareholders gain, and bidding firm
shareholders do not lose).
65. See Jensen, supra note 64, at 112.
66. As one indication of the size of the conventional buyout market, 36 companies went private in
1983 by this route (totaling $7.1 billion) as opposed to 16 public-to-private transactions in 1979
(totaling $636 million). Much, Leveraging Your Life, INDUSTRY WK., July 9, 1984, at 41, 42 (citing
report by W.T. Grimm & Co., merger consultants). One observer estimated the leveraged buyout
market will reach $20 billion in 1984. Leveraged Buyouts: Switching Corporate Ownership To The
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Companies offering high returns due to an undervaluation that escapes
general market scrutiny, and thus presumptively employee scrutiny as
well, can therefore be expected to end up in outside investor control
through a conventional leveraged buyout or some other form of corporate
acquisition.67
Private investor groups have the additional advantage over workers of
being able to search the market for a particular target of interest. Employ-
ees, by contrast, have only the option to buy their own firm, which in
practice reflects a buyout decision made by management to which no ef-
fective dissent is possible.6 8
An undervalued purchase price might result from management's with-
holding from the market valuable information about company prospects.
But this source of undervaluation is contrary to public policy. And under-
valuation due to withheld information offers no gain to society-it leads to
a transfer in wealth from selling shareholders to new owners, and re-
quires costly monitoring to ensure that employees are not chosen as equity
partners over sophisticated outside investors because the employees can be
expected to be more pliant and perhaps vulnerable to accepting a reduced
share of new firm earnings.
69
Employees, CHEMICAL WK., Sept. 5, 1984, at 40, 40. With major commercial, investment and special-
ized banking firms searching the market for potential deals, prices have inevitably risen: "The me-
dian-price-earnings ratio paid by investors to acquire companies or business units via an LBO [lever-
aged buyout] surged to 13.8 times earnings [in 1983], from 8.9 times earnings in 1979. . . ." Much,
supra, at 42 (again citing study by W.T. Grimm). Results would need to be adjusted for movements
in the stock market to confirm their significance.
67. Consider as an example the $40 million non-employee buyout by management of Phibro-
Salomon's Natural Resource Division, Phibro-Resources. In the two years preceding the buyout, the
division incurred $158 million in operating losses and asset writedowns. With $5 million in equity, a
$15 million note from Phibro and a bank credit line, the President of the division, John Lee, joined
with a wealthy Saudi investor to take the company private. Within eight months, the company sold its
Natural Zinc unit to St. Joe Minerals for $35 million, leaving the firm with clear title to a substantial
Florida-based fertilizer operation (with access to low-cost sulfur supplies from the Saudi investor), an
oil and gas operation and an inactive vanadium processing plant. Mr. Lee is reported to be well-
pleased: "'This is a textbook LBO .... We've made a lot of money and have a lot of borrowing
power."' Leveraged Buyouts: Switching Corporate Ownership To The Employees, supra note 66, at
43. Clearly markets are not always efficient, and just as clearly, government incentives to share such
gains with employees are unlikely to succeed in many circumstances.
68. As long as the buyout plan meets the statutory requirements set out under ERISA and the
Code, workers have no power to overturn an employee buyout transaction.
69. See, e.g., Letter from the U.S. Department of Labor to Attorneys for Raymond International,
Inc. (Sept. 12, 1983) (Government questions management's taking of a bigger piece of firm's potential
appreciation than available to employees), reprinted in LAW & BusINEss INC., EMPLOYEE STOCK
OWNERSHIP PLANS UNDER THE 1984 TAx LAW 228-35 (1984); Hoerr, supra note 3, at 94, 102
(leveraged ESOP buyout "'arguably, a transfer of wealth from the employers to the managers"')
(quoting former Treasury Dept. official).
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2. Tax Subsidies
Congress promises that ESOP tax incentives will stimulate new wealth
creation, when in fact the program achieves only a tax-based wealth
transfer. Specifically, Congress fails to consider the likely consequence of
offering tax subsidies in the context of a competitive market for corporate
control.
Congress explicitly rejects redistribution through taxation as a policy
support for the leveraged ESOP program.70 Yet to the extent a firm in-
creases in value due to interest deductions or specific tax benefits, this
increase represents a straight transfer from the pockets of the general pub-
lic to a specific firm, which by the program's own terms must be
condemned.
In practice, when conventional financing fails to support a winning bid
for a target company, the leveraged ESOP tax subsidies will likely be
used to boost the offering price to selling shareholders.7 1 In essence, con-
gressional largesse towards workers will flow through to the selling share-
holders. The government has thus shaped a most peculiar transfer pro-
gram of no discernable benefit to the economy and contrary to the core
assumption of the ESOP program that current shareholders are already
too wealthy.
Finally, to the extent the firm retains the tax subsidies, the employee
buyout structure obtains public funds unavailable to non-ESOP-leveraged
businesses. Government-sponsored finance credits thus become an instru-
ment of intra-industry subsidy, violating the principle that the tax code
should not discriminate among industry groups or between industry
competitors. 2
3. Incentive Effects
The justification for the leveraged ESOP program reduces to an incen-
tive argument. Suggested benefits resulting from employee stock owner-
ship include improved labor-management cooperation and greater produc-
tivity from workers, who as equity holders stand to benefit from improved
70. Long Statement, supra note 2, at S16633 ("ESOP-type financing techniques are designed to
avoid the redistribution of ownership of existing capital for the simple reason that we cannot build a
broadly based private property economy on the expropriation of anyone's property.").
71. See Much, supra note 66, at 42 (discussing rising price/earnings ratio for buyout candidates).
See also Hyatt, ESOP Changes Could Up The Acquisition Ante, INC., Oct. 1984, at 37, 37 ("'There
is going to be cutthroat competition between the employee groups and the larger companies ...
Each will try to prove to the owner that its offer is better"') (quoting Harvard Professor Joseph
Blasi).
72. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, TREASURY REPORT ON TAX SIMPLIFICATION AND RE-
FORM 117 (Nov. 1984) (endorsement by the Treasury Department of a tax system that "will foster
neutrality in the selection of organizational form, and in the choice among alternative methods of
finance").
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firm performance. Whether these benefits are in fact realized is in part an
empirical question not susceptible to general analysis. Some studies claim
to show productivity gains and improved financial performance in worker-
owned firms, while others detect no benefit."' At this time the evidence
must be judged to be inconclusive. 4
The empirical debate obscures Congress' fundamental error in subsi-
dizing a corporate form of ownership that will be adopted without subsidy
if genuinely efficient. The net effect of the tax expenditure will simply be
to pay corporations to behave as they would otherwise, but at a substan-
tial cost to the general public.
Moreover, any incentive effects these plans have will be undercut by the
practical problems they engender. Specialists in the employee buyout field
73. See, e.g., Rosen & Klein, Job Creating Performance of Employee-Owned Firms, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Aug. 1983, at 15, 17 ("Employee-owned companies averaged an annual employment
growth rate 2.78 percent higher than that of comparable conventional firms.") McCrackin & Davis,
Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Economic Boon for the Southeast?, ECON. REV. (Fed. Res. Bank of
Atlanta), Oct., 1983, at 20, 21 (in survey of 350 Southeastern ESOPs, few plans seek or realize
productivity gains); Livingston & Henry, The Effect of Employee Stock Ownership Plans On Corpo-
rate Profits, 47 J. RISK AND INS. 491, 501-02 (1980) (matching 51 ESOP companies to comparable
non-ESOP firms indicates that ESOP companies are less profitable); Marsh & McAllister, ESOP
Tables: A Survey Of Companies With Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 6 J. CORP. L. 551, 613-16,
619 (1981) (statistical survey of managerial respondents in 128 ESOP companies indicates ESOP
companies have markedly higher productivity for the four-year period 1975-79).
74. The National Center for Employee Ownership concluded in 1983 that "there have been few
methodologically sound evaluations of [employee stock ownership] plans." Rosen & Klein, supra note
73, at 15. More recently, however, the executive director of the organization made the limited claim
that "[t]here are now several studies which indicate a strong association between employee ownership
and corporate performance." Rosen, Letter to the Editor, Wall St. J., Apr. 30, 1985, at 31, col. 2. In
1986, the General Accounting Office will issue a report on the effects of employee ownership that
aims to be more comprehensive than previous studies.
The empirical research taken as a whole reflects the difficulty of isolating the contribution of stock
ownership to firm performance. Without an underlying normative model, researchers are generally
forced to rely on two methods of analysis: 1) identification of "comparable" non-employee owned
firms or 2) an analysis of firms subsequent to implementation of a sizable ESOP. A variety of difficul-
ties arise in basing ESOP research on "employee-owned" versus "comparable" firms, including a bias
in selection, an absence of sufficient data, accounting differences, and the failure to prove a causal link
between stock ownership and firm performance.
Furthermore, the empirical studies fall to distinguish between improved performance that results
from employees' willingness to accept compensation in the form of employer stock as opposed to the
ostensible benefits resulting from congressionally authorized access to subsidized credit. Since compen-
sation in the form of stock has no necessary connection to the leveraged ESOP program, the limited
research available offers no theoretical justification for continuation of a federal subsidy program.
One consequence of the search to uncover compelling statistics has been the pronounced tendency to
overstate findings without noting the severe limitations of the underlying study. This is perhaps best
illustrated by the use of a 1977 study commissioned by the Department of Commerce which analyzed
pretax profits on sales compared against an industry mean. M. CONTE, A. TANNENBAUM, D. Mc-
CULLOCH, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP (1981) at 20-27. The study is regularly cited for the supposed
finding that employee-owned firms are roughly 1.5 times as profitable as conventionally-owned firms.
See, e.g., Long Statement, supra note 2, at S16630; Rosen & Whyte, supra note 6, at 1 & n.3;
Woodworth, supra note 6, at 51 & n.1. What these and other authors neglect to mention about the
study is that the profit finding, in addition to its serious methodological problems, has no statistical
significance. M. CONTE, A. TANNENBAUM, D. MCCULLOCH, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, supra, at 23.
("[W]e are not able to claim statistical significance for these figures since the variance in profitability
among firms is relatively large and the number of cases is small.").
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describe the initial enthusiasm of workers for the new enterprise structure
as a halo effect. 5 Within a short period of time, tensions inherent in run-
ning a successful enterprise can be expected to resurface for reasons relat-
ing to lack of control, perceived inequities, and inadequate resources.
Without control of the board, workers in many instances report that the
ostensible benefits of ownership appear to be illusory."6 Gradual alloca-
tion and vesting of shares exacerbate the problem." The complexity of the
new financial structure raises serious problems of fairness, 8 including the
allegation that numerous buyouts entrench management instead of em-
powering workers." Related valuation problems arise in pricing the
closely-held securities at the time of an employee's retirement or departure
from the firm.80
The problem of free-riding workers presents serious additional difficul-
ties. Workers who failed to produce at optimal levels prior to the buyout
now stand to benefit directly from the exertion of coworkers. Union sen-
iority rules often still control internal governance, making disciplinary ac-
tions difficult and costly to enforce. Meanwhile, firm performance, and
hence stock value, can decline due to factors beyond a worker's control, an
often-overlooked risk of equity ownership.81
III. SYSTEMATIC HARM OF THE LEVERAGED ESOP
Even admitting the potential incentive benefits of stock ownership, it is
nonetheless necessary to consider the injuries to workers and the economy
caused by the leveraged ESOP program. Given the breadth of these inju-
ries, the net impact of the leveraged ESOP program will likely be small,
or more probably, absolutely harmful to workers.
75. See, e.g., D. ZWERDLING, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY 78 (1984) (after buyout of furniture
plant workers said that the "'we saved our jobs' euphoria . . . has begun to sour").
76. Id. at 78-79 (bitterness toward management for lack of control over operations or investments
after buyout). Private companies without securities required to be registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission must only pass through voting rights on greater-than-majority issues as defined
by law or corporate charter. I.R.C. 409(e) (West Supp. 1985).
77. See Kaplan & Ludwig, supra note 2, at A3, A9 (reviewing the mechanics of allocation and
vesting).
78. Gottschalk, Parson's Acquisition by Employee Stock Plan Raises Some Questions About Who
Benefited, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1985 at 4, col. 1.
79. See, e.g., Tell, ESOP or MESOP? A Good Idea Is Being Put to Dubious Use, BARRON'S,
Mar. 18, 1985, at 8, 8.
80. Without a public market, valuation formulas are likely to weight too heavily a firm's book
value (because it is known), and undervalue uncertain future investment returns. Financial theory
offers little specific assistance beyond setting a broad feasible range of prices. As a result, workers are
left to bear the risk of contesting valuations.
81. Regarding the Hyatt-Clark plant, for example, Harvard Professor Joseph Blasi comments,
"Worker ownership doesn't magically eliminate the complexities of a poor market, poor management
and a poor economy." Leslie, A Modern ESOP's Fable, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 1984, at 58.
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A. Concentration of Risk
Employee-owners suffer an immediate reduction in value as a result of
losing the benefits of diversification. The loss is significant;8" commenta-
tors now suggest that the value of diversification may be a principal rea-
son for the prevalent separation of ownership and control in the
economy.88
Prior to the buyout, employees invest pension assets in a diversified
portfolio in the capital markets. After the buyout, workers forfeit their
rights to a pension in return for an equity position in the firm. No longer
can employees eliminate unique firm-related risks and benefit from pro-
ductive returns available elsewhere in the economy. Instead, the buyout
locks in their capital, eliminating its mobility. The policy runs counter to
ordinary notions of prudence, as well as the cornerstone tenet of financial
theory that the market will not compensate investors for bearing diversifi-
able risk.8 4 As a consequence, workers, who have already invested their
human capital in the firm, suffer the incremental harm attributable to
bearing the unique risk of firm performance. Workers own a single asset
far riskier than they would otherwise choose. In the event of bankruptcy,
workers lose their jobs and their pension assets. These results alone could
be sufficient to justify elimination of the ESOP subsidies.
B. Foregone Investment Opportunities and Reinvestment Shortfall
In perfect capital markets all investments that create wealth can be fi-
nanced.85 Sometimes, however, investments are subject to capital ration-
ing. Firms are forced to forego valuable investment projects because lend-
ing institutions may be unwilling to lend on a project at a competitive
rate.
82. In fact, capital asset pricing theory is built upon "the crucial distinction between diversifiable
and non-diversifiable risk." R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 55, at 784.
83.
The critical financial characteristic of private corporations is that the absence of a public mar-
ket prevents their owners from achieving optimally diversified portfolios by selling off a por-
tion of the ownership of the private company. As a result, the company may well be worth
more to a publicly held acquiring company, whose shareholders can optimally diversify, than
to the private owners of the company.
Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE LJ. 239, 283
n.111 (1985). The benefits of diversification would also apply to investors in private buyouts who hold
a sufficiently large and diverse portfolio. For a discussion of the well-documented benefits of diversifi-
cation under modem financial theory, see, e.g., R. BRFALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 55, at 123-26.
84. See id. at 140 ("Since investors can diversify away unique risk, they will not demand a higher
return from stocks that have above-average unique risk. . . . [Tihe capital asset pricing model states
that the expected risk premium from any investment should vary in direct proportion to its market
risk.").
85. See id. at 19 (perfectly competitive capital markets imply: no barrier to financing wealth-
generating projects, zero transaction costs, no distorting taxes, and costless, widely disseminated
information).
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The leveraged buyout creates an extreme case of capital rationing en-
forced by lenders through restrictive covenants limiting firm operations as
a condition of the loan. In pledging debt capacity to the lender, the firm
loses investment opportunities it might otherwise have undertaken. While
the cost of foregone projects is difficult to quantify, the value of the firm is
undeniably reduced by the capital constraint.8
A distinct, but related problem is the reinvestment shortfall facing the
employee-owned firm. In broadest terms, a firm's ability to reinvest for
future earnings depends crucially on its net cash flow. In the early years
of the buyout, free cash flow is negligible since the funds ordinarily avail-
able for investment must be paid over to the acquisition lender instead of
being reinvested by the firm. In addition, unlike the conventional buyout,
the ESOP-financed takeover faces a major additional drain on its invest-
ment resources from the obligation to repurchase stock from departing
employees.87
The employee-owned firm thus confronts two barriers to investment
cash generation: the debt repayment obligation and the repurchase liabil-
ity. Moreover, the firm must typically reduce capital investment spending
for many years, thereby sacrificing a critical ingredient of higher
productivity."
86. See id. at 103-07 (shareholder wealth reduced if both firm and shareholder are barred from
well-functioning capital markets).
87. See Schuchert, ESOP Leveraged Buyouts, in Employee Stock Ownership Plans under the
1984 Tax Law 179, 199-201 (R. Ludwig & R. Reichler eds. 1984). According to a recent analysis by
two prominent theorists, the limited market for closely-held stock generates an additional incentive to
systematically underinvest. Fama & Jensen, Organizational Forms & Investment Decisions, 14 J.
FIN. ECON. 101, 107 (1985) ("The difficulties in designing valuation processes to substitute for the
capital market . . . means that partnerships and closed corporations will not generally follow the
value maximizing decision rule. They will tend to underinvest in assets with long-term payoffs whose
current value are not easily established."). The underinvestment bias is reinforced by the limited
diversification, which leads closed corporation equity holders "to undervalue claims on future cash
flows" relative to wealth-maximizing decision rules followed by open (i.e., public) corporations. Id. at
119.
88. For the underinvestment bias in closely-held corporations, augmented by limited diversifica-
tion, see supra note 87.
Moreover, many leveraged buyouts, whether conventional or ESOP-based, are not prone, absent
excellent management, to produce productivity gains beyond those realized in restructuring an ineffi-
cient organization. Lenders demand and buyers seek out mature businesses characterized by a stable
cash flow stream. These stable flows are typically generated by established, low growth firms where
the prospect of recurring gains from improved labor productivity is slim. See Kaufman, Lang, Ley
and Messineo, Leveraged Buy-Outs and Other Asset-Oriented Transactions, in PRACTICiNG LAW
INsT-TE, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK No. 419, ACQUISITION AND
MERGER TACTCS AND TECHNOLOGY 1983, at 411, 414.
Underinvestment in the employee buyout firm compounds the problem because, as Senator Long
ironically recognizes, "[p]roductivity is, in part, dependent upon individual effort. However, and this
is particularly true of our crucial infrastructure, to a great extent productivity is dependent upon
technological advances. . . ." Long Statement, supra note 2, at S16631 (emphasis added).
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C. The Final Period Problem
Workers nearing retirement in the employee-owned firm have a strong
interest in protecting the value of their shares. They will understandably
vote and lobby against investments of extended maturity."' The buyout
accentuates the much-criticized tendency of American business to focus on
short-term profits, both because of the enormous debt load, and because of
the interest of workers in protecting the value of their investment.
Finance theory identifies this problem as one of incompatible time hori-
zons.90 While the value of the firm would benefit from a long term invest-
ment horizon, retiring employees maximize their individual return by
avoiding projects with distant payoffs. The horizon problem is a serious,
predictable, and real cost of the buyout."
IV. THE MODEL FOR REFORM
As the first step to reform, Congress should eliminate all ESOP subsi-
dies which supplement the tax benefit already granted to pension invest-
ments generally. 2 Terminating these subsidies would send the proper sig-
nal that the government recognizes that subsidy credits in the buyout
market do not benefit workers, the companies they own, or the economy at
large.93
89. See Jensen & Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-
Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. Bus., 469, 483 (1979) ("[W]orkers [in a labor-managed
firm] have strong incentives to behave in ways which maximize the near-term net cash flows of the
firm."). Among the strategies available to workers are increased salaries in place of maintenance, cash
payout of borrowings where the repayment obligation falls to future employees, selected investment in
projects with high near-term cash flows, and sharp increases in pension benefits, again with the costs
deferred to the future. Id. at 483-84. The tendency to underinvest is compounded by stock repurchase
formulas weighted toward book value. See supra note 80.
90. Capital asset pricing theory depends on the assumption that investors have a common time
horizon. Gilson, supra note 83, at 252. When this condition fails, as in the employee-owned firm,
"strategic, opportunistic behavior" can be expected as the parties seek to "maximize value in the
period relevant to [them], even at the expense of a decrease in value in the period relevant to the other
party. This conflict reduces the value of the [enterprise]." Id. at 265.
91. As an example, consider the case of Hyatt-Clark, a 100% employee-owned operation divested
in 1981 by General Motors. In 1984, the company reported a six month profit of $2.2 million, enti-
tling the workers under an old contract to S600,000 in profit-sharing compensation. See, Leslie, supra
note 81, at 58.
In response to management's decision to postpone the profit-sharing in anticipation of a $14 million
capital expenditure program, workers organized a slowdown that cost the company an estimated $4
million. To avert a strike, which would have meant the loss of its biggest customer, General Motors, a
new contract was signed. The chairman of the company is reported as saying that he did not know
where the company would get the money to pay for the new contract. Id.
92. See supra text accompanying note 16-33.
93. The Treasury Department, in response to President Reagan's 1984 call for comprehensive tax
reform, proposed the elimination of the 1984 ESOP subsidies, as well as the elimination of most other
specialized ESOP benefits. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, TREASURY REPORT ON TAX SiMpmLsicA-
MON AND REFORM 324-27 (Dec. 3, 1984). The tax reform package submitted by the President to
Congress, however, rejects this approach and instead proposes to remove ESOPs from the statutory
control of ERISA and significantly expand employee rights to vote and sell their shares. See THE
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If firms believe that workers who are shareholders work harder, Con-
gress should be confident that this aspect of the program will be perpetu-
ated by competitive markets without the lure of subsidized indebtedness.
Specifically, firms are free to compensate workers with relatively more
stock and less wages. This approach would mimic management executives'
mixed compensation plans of salary and performance-related bonuses.
Traditionally, organized labor has opposed profit-sharing plans that re-
place current compensation 94 because they want to protect workers from
the risk of declining performance. Even if this union opposition is short-
sighted, a subsidized program of stock ownership is not the proper vehicle
to shift worker compensation toward incentive pay. The current leveraged
ESOP program tries to hide the change in risk structure with incomplete
and incorrect arguments about wealth creation and equity ownership.
PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY, 314-
19 (1985). Virtually all the ESOP tax subsidies are retained, eliminating only the assumption of
estate tax liability by the ESOP. In addition, firms would be obligated to pass through to workers any
savings realized by deducting ESOP dividends. The principal guiding the proposed changes is that
ESOPs should promote direct employee ownership, rather than serve as a retirement vehicle.
The proposal exposes the fundamental weakness of the ESOP program. The basic defect remains
that no persuasive justification is given for continued subsidization of stock ownership. In fact, the
value of the subsidy is potentially increased due to a related proposal change limiting the deduction
for stock bonus plans to 15% of payroll compensation. See id. at 351-54.
Ironically, the move toward freely alienable ESOP stock, a correct economic proposition, further
undermines the rationale for subsidizing leveraged stock ownership. Workers are encouraged under
the President's proposal to behave as investors, holding stock because they view it as a good invest-
ment, but one to be sold presumably when the expected return falls relative to investments of compa-
rable risk. Since leveraging does not affect firm value, except possibly due to the wealth transfer from
the general public in the form of an interest tax shield, no reason exists for tying ESOP subsidies to
debt financing.
The investment decision highlighted by the Reagan proposal correctly recognizes that ESOPs re-
present an allocation of worker wealth to employer stock. Yet there is no reason to believe that em-
ployer stock should be systematically undervalued relative to alternative investments. In fact, it is a
logically impossible condition to apply to firms in general (i.e., to the extent all firms are "underval-
ued," no relative advantage accrues to investing in employer stock, and likewise all investors taken
individually cannot all do better than the average).
From an investment perspective, the leveraging allows workers to borrow against future compensa-
tion to purchase employer stock at the current price, instead of at an annually fluctuating rate. But
such an investment decision cannot credibly be tied to a subsidy that systematically biases workers into
believing that today's price is uniquely undervalued relative to future investment opportunities in
either the firm or comparable investment alternatives. Nor does the Administration proposal address
the problem of valuing private enterprises, where efficient pricing is unlikely to result from appraisals,
or the fact that in public firms workers already have the resources at hand in the form of accumulated
pension income to make sizable investment purchases of employer stock were it so desired.
At most, then, the President's proposal recognizes the inconsistency of ERISA and the ostensible
aims of the ESOP program, see supra text accompanying notes 35-42, and narrows the sole rationale
for the program to the incentive argument, rather than the access to credit theories embedded in the
legislative record. Unfortunately, the Administration has missed an ideal opportunity for tax reform
by mistaking correct principles of economic freedom for the invalid claims of subsidized employee
stock ownership.
94. See, e.g., Woodworth, supra note 6, at 47.
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Congress, by focusing on compensation, would return the debate about
stock ownership to a proper grounding in financial reality.95
More speculatively, Congress should permit workers greater control
over the pension assets that they have already earned. Private pension
assets alone total approximately $900 billion, ranking these funds as one
of the largest sources of discretionary investment capital in the economy."
To the extent workers want more control, Congress should consider let-
ting workers invest these accumulated funds in company stock. The loss of
diversification benefits would be obvious, not hidden as they are under the
current regime. And, arguably, this risk-reward tradeoff belongs not to
society but to the workers who own these assets.
9 7
95. Martin Weitzman in a recent book argues that compensation pegged to firm performance, if
adopted by a significant proportion of the economy, has the potential to simultaneously combat stag-
nation and inflation. M. WEITZMAN, THE SHARE ECONOMY: CONQUERING STAGFLATION 72-95
(1984). The underlying rationale is that a fluctuating wage frees firms from a concern with over-
hiring since their wage bill will fall in tandem with declining performance. The result is a permanent
excess demand for labor. Id. at 84-88. Achieving this condition underlies the central macroeconomic
claim that a "share economy" will tend to be less subject to cyclical downturns and cost-push infla-
tion. Id at 106-07, 111-18.
To achieve the "public good" of a share economy, Professor Weitzman argues that tax subsidies be
given to the "share" portion of employee earned income. Id. at 129-31. Whatever the eventual merit
of the Weitzman proposal (see Matthews, Book Review, 23 J. EcoN. LrrERATURE 658 (1985) (criti-
quing Weitzman's book)), the point can be made that the share economy does not provide an unin-
tended basis for continuation of the leveraged ESOP pension subsidy.
Insofar as the ESOP program reflects the theorizing of Louis Kelso, the underlying assumptions of
Kelso and Weitzman stand in opposition. Specifically, Kelso claims that capital ownership must be
subsidized for workers because labor earns "less that 10% of U.S. personal income." Kelso Letter,
supra note 59. Professor Weitzman almost precisely inverts these figures, estimating that the return to
labor constitutes 80% of annual national income, with the balance flowing to unearned income in the
form of capital gains, and tax-free municipal interest income, among other sources. See WErrzMAN,
supra, at 129; S. SpmsER, A PIECE OF THE ACTIoN 112 (1977) (quoting Professor Paul Samuelson
that, contrary to Kelso's claims, labor earns approximately 75% of gross national product). Thus, to
accept Weitzman's theory, even as a speculative economic proposition, is to reject the fundamental
authority for the leveraged access to capital underpinning the Congressional ESOP program.
Weitzman's theory also establishes the justification for the subsidy as promoting a shift in the
macroeconomic behavior of the economy, not as the result of incentives for increased individual efforts.
WErrzMAN, supra, at 142-46. The ESOP program, in contrast, rests on propositions about debt
financing that this Note argues are unsupported either in theory or practice.
Finally, Professor Weitzman himself sees no connection between ESOP subsidies and improved
macroeconomic performance, especially in the area of job creation, which is a prime aspect of his
share economy proposal. The ESOP program in his view could play a valuable role in easing the
transition for hard hit distressed industries. But as a general policy initiative, he rejects the claim that
ESOP subsidies create wealth or broaden capital ownership. Telephone interview with Martin Weitz-
man (July 23, 1985).
96. See, e.g., Goodman & Harpham, Toward Real Pension Security, Wail St. J., Jan. 22, 1985,
at 34, col. 3.
97. The loss of diversification could impose so great a cost that it forces a policy conclusion that
restraints need to be imposed on permissible investment strategies, thereby affirming the general value
of ERISA-based regulation. The aggregate risk of the investment may be more than most workers
prefer. Moreover, the government may be forced to intervene in any event should a pension invest-
ment failure leave hundreds of thousands of employees without any retirement income.
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CONCLUSION
The federal leveraged ESOP program stands condemned on numerous
grounds. Principally, the economics underlying the program are without
merit. Congress mistakenly assumes that granting workers access to subsi-
dized credit can create wealth. In addition, the program forces workers to
concentrate all their holdings in the firm. The loss of diversification im-
poses costs borne willingly by no other group of investors in our economy.
Finally, to the extent that equity ownership improves productivity, market
incentives will efficiently lead firms to compensate employees with stock.
By eliminating tax benefits for leveraged ESOPs, Congress can at once
save substantial public funds and acknowledge that subsidized ownership
of stock will not lead to worker capitalism or a more productive economy.
